We are happy to introduce K. G. Sharma, a veteran newsman who has observed and reported on India's foreign policy for years in the News Room of Doordarshan News. In his first article for this web-magazine, Sharma argues that India’s diplomacy often prioritises spectacle over strategy while it lacks in institutional planning. Stressing that personal chemistry with world leaders cannot substitute for institutional relationships, he advocates strengthening of the institutional backbone of country's diplomacy.
Summitry and Sanctions: Foreign Policy Between Performance and Policy
K. G. Sharma
India’s participation in the 2025 SCO Summit in Tianjin displayed all the hallmarks of high diplomacy: ceremonial warmth, carefully choreographed optics, and symbolic breakthroughs. Yet, beneath the surface of restored flights and revived pilgrimages lies an unsettling question—where is India’s foreign policy actually headed?
For Prime Minister Narendra Modi, long celebrated for energetic diplomacy and his ability to command the global stage, Tianjin was an opportunity to reaffirm India’s strategic relevance. However, just as the summit concluded with handshakes and declarations, Washington was preparing a hammer blow: sweeping 50% tariffs on Indian exports. This juxtaposition—diplomatic triumph on one front, economic setback on another—underscores a deeper malaise in India’s external engagement: a policy increasingly reactive, optics-heavy, and lacking strategic coherence.
A Summit of Symbols, Not Solutions
Modi’s visit to China—his first in seven years—was framed as a diplomatic reset. Passenger flights resumed, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was reinstated, and border trade was reopened. The Tianjin Declaration condemned terrorism, explicitly referencing the Pahalgam attack, a rare alignment with India’s counterterror narrative. These were welcome, even necessary, developments. But they were also the low-hanging fruit.
The hard realities remain untouched. The Line of Actual Control continues to be tense, with Chinese incursions staying as they were, even as diplomats met. There was no progress on disengagement, demilitarisation, or trust-building. India’s engagement with China remains marked by tactical shifts—oscillating between confrontation and conciliation—rather than a clearly articulated strategy. A cohesive China policy, beyond symbolic gestures and ad hoc dialogue, is still absent.
Trump Tariffs: A Blow Foreseen, Yet Unprepared For
While Modi posed with regional leaders in Tianjin, the U.S. administration under Donald Trump was finalising punitive tariffs on Indian exports—textiles, gems, engineering goods, and chemicals. The official reasoning: India’s continued import of discounted Russian oil, and its resistance to opening strategic sectors to American firms.
To be clear, these tariffs are politically charged and economically harsh. But more troubling than the act itself was New Delhi’s reaction—or lack thereof. There appeared to be no contingency plan, no back-channel mitigation, and no credible economic buffer. The government seemed blindsided, responding only after the damage was done.
This reflects a deeper issue: the centralisation of foreign policy around personal rapport and spectacle. Modi’s emphasis on leader-to-leader diplomacy—from “Howdy Modi” to “Namaste Trump”—may have generated headlines, but it failed to insulate India from the sharp edges of American economic nationalism. Trust, it turns out, is no substitute for preparedness.
At home, the response has been muted and inadequate. While the Prime Minister has spoken of resilience and self-reliance, MSMEs in export hubs like Tirupur and Surat are reporting cancelled orders and mounting losses. Engineering clusters in Ludhiana are even considering relocation to tariff-free zones in Mexico. Yet, the government has offered little in the way of direct fiscal support or a credible export diversification strategy. Beyond exhortations to “find new markets,” there is no safety net.
Strategic Drift and Institutional Weakness
India’s foreign policy increasingly appears driven by short-term political calculus rather than long-term strategic thinking. Key decisions—whether on Russia, the U.S., or China—are often taken with limited institutional debate. The Ministry of External Affairs, once central to policy formulation, has been relegated to an implementation role. Strategic inputs from economists, technocrats, and regional experts are bypassed in favour of top-down, politically expedient choices.
This has led to glaring inconsistencies: aligning with China on counterterrorism at the SCO, while opposing its Belt and Road Initiative; doubling down on Russian oil imports, while courting deeper defence ties with Washington; promoting Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliance), while seeking foreign capital and technology to accelerate manufacturing.
India also continues to send mixed signals on multilateralism. While we speak often of a multipolar world and strategic autonomy, India’s behaviour on the international stage often reflects cautious hedging rather than leadership. The SCO summit could have been a platform to propose an alternative vision for regional trade and connectivity. Instead, India played safe—rejecting Chinese-led initiatives without offering clear alternatives of its own. The Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) remain underfunded and under-leveraged.
Between Ambition and Execution
At its core, India’s foreign policy is caught between ambition and delivery. The SCO summit may have burnished India’s image as a regional heavyweight, but the Trump tariffs exposed its economic fragility and strategic unpreparedness. Foreign policy is not merely about presence at global forums; it is about shaping outcomes in India’s favour. That requires clarity of vision, institutional strength, and economic resilience—qualities currently in short supply.
The time has come to move beyond pageantry. India must strengthen the institutional backbone of its diplomacy, empower its expert corps, and anticipate global shifts with greater foresight. Economic security can no longer be treated as separate from strategic planning. Nor can personal chemistry with foreign leaders substitute for institutional relationships and robust contingency frameworks.
The world is watching. And in today’s fractured geopolitical climate, it’s no longer enough to show up and smile. India must demonstrate it can not only narrate but also negotiate—on equal terms, with equal skill.
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The author is a freelance journalist and retired officer from the Indian Information Service.
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